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Mark Beeson 
 
One of the most striking aspects of the turmoil that gripped East Asia in the aftermath of 
the recent economic crisis, was the rapid change in the way the region was perceived. 
From being primarily associated with ‘miraculous’ development and enlightened public 
policy, the region rapidly became a synonym for corruption and ‘crony capitalism’. 
Consequently,  many observers – especially, but not exclusively external ones - called for 
fundamental changes in the way politics and business were conducted in East Asia. 
Significantly, a particular preoccupation with institutional reform emerged, as 
appropriate institutions were considered a key element of successful public policy. As the 
Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) observed: 
 
…the right framework for policy formulation and execution … includes the regulations and 
legislation governing economic activity and all other areas of human interaction … Where 
the rules and regulations are clear, and where institutions apply them predictably and 
impartially, economic security will flourish, and social justice becomes possible (Ouattara 
1999:4, emphasis added). 
 
The IMF has been at the forefront of a campaign which has called for ‘vast change in 
[East Asian] domestic business practices, corporate culture, and government behaviour’ 
(Fischer 1998:3), on the grounds that without profound change ‘the causes of the disease’ 
that precipitated the crisis will not be eradicated (Lane et al 1999: 123). If successful, it is 
a reform agenda the scope of which would see a fundamental transformation of not 
simply political practices and economic structures, but of East Asian social relations 
more generally.  
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There is no intention here of either presenting an analysis of the crisis itself, or of taking 
issue with the technical aspects of the  IMF’s interpretation and subsequent management 
of the crisis.1 What is of greatest interest here is the IMF’s conviction that not only were 
the particular configurations of institutions in East Asia somehow to blame for the crisis, 
but that they must be fundamentally reformed if the region is to return to its former 
prosperity. Even if we gloss over the fact that precisely the same sets of institutions 
appear to have been responsible for both the rise and fall of East Asia, the important issue 
for the purposes of this volume is the preoccupation with institutions as key determinants 
of social welfare and economic development, and consequently as key targets of 
reformist pressures.  
 
The key issue to consider, therefore, is will change occur in East Asia as a consequence 
of these pressures or, conversely, will change be resisted? In either case, institutions 
provide an important focus of analytical attention with which to consider such 
possibilities. For if change is occurring in East Asia, it will be manifest in the historically 
specific institutions that have distinguished the region. Focusing on key institutions 
allows us both to identify possible sources of, or resistance to change, and provides a way 
of conceptualising its extent. In this manner it is possible to distinguish change that may – 
or may not – be occurring at the national level, from developments which may be taking 
place at the sectoral or even the regional level. Moreover, an institutional focus allows us 
to identify possible sources of, or obstacles to change, and to distinguish those that may 
be internal to the region from those that may be external. In this way, it is possible to 
build up a picture of the forces that are shaping the region, allowing us to develop a more 
accurate picture of post-crisis east Asia, one that transcends the limitations country 
specific analysis.  
 
This chapter introduces some of the most important variants of institutional theory and 
attempts to isolate some of the more significant insights that emerge from within it. The 
first section consequently assess the contributions to institutional theory from economics, 
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political science, sociology and an historically based form of institutionalism. The second 
section extends this analysis and looks more closely at its applicability in an East Asian 
context. I suggest that an institutional perspective allows us to identify both the most 
important structures or relationships which make up a specific national political-economy 
or even region, as well as the internal and external forces that are likely to promote or 
inhibit change. The central argument here is that traumas like the recent crisis provide 
moments in which new policy initiatives or ideas - such as those promoted by the IMF - 
have an opportunity to take hold; whether they will do so is highly dependent on the way 
specific institutions are embedded in wider networks of power and interest within the 
region. Institutional theory provides an important framework with which to try and make 
sense of the complex dialectic between the national and the transnational, between the 
ideational and the material, and between the forces of inertia and change. 
 
Institutional Theory2 
 
 In this section I review some of the key varieties of institutional theory. Although the 
demarcation employed here is somewhat arbitrary, as some theorists cross disciplinary 
boundaries, and some distinctions are inevitably somewhat artificial, nevertheless, I shall 
distinguish between ‘economic’, ‘political’, ‘sociological’ and ‘historical’ forms of 
institutionalism to organise the subsequent discussion. Before embarking on this 
endeavour, however, let me offer some preliminary comments about institutions and 
distinguish them from the ‘organisations’ that feature in the title of this book. 
 
Institutions are notoriously difficult to define, but one of the common distinguishing 
qualities identified in much of the literature is that they intimately connected to recurrent 
patterns of social behaviour. At the outset it is important to stress that the relationship 
between institutions and social activity  is complex and reciprocal; institutions are part of 
an intricate dialectical process that both shapes and is shaped by contingent human 
activity. Scott (1995: 33) defines institutions this way: 
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Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are transported by various 
carriers – cultures, structures, and routines – and they operate at multiple levels of 
jurisdiction. . . Although constructed and maintained by individual actions, institutions 
assume the guise of an impersonal and objective reality. 
 
One of the defining qualities of institutions, therefore, is their capacity to regulate human 
activities and reflect overarching norms and values. This is not, it should be emphasised, 
to suggest that there is anything ‘natural’ or inevitable about the development of 
institutions or the values they embody. Clearly, some actors or forces have a greater 
capacity to determine influential norms and social practices than others (Cox 1991). The 
important point to make at this stage is that institutions play a crucial role in defining 
quotidian reality. 
 
It is the routinisation or the institutionalisation of patterns of activity that is such a crucial 
determinant of ‘the way things happen’ in a particular part of the world. While particular 
institutions – the law or civil society, for example  – may superficially seem universal 
conceptions, their content and meaning may be very different because of the specific 
social setting  within which they are embodied or realised. By looking at the way 
particular institutions are manifest in specific locations, and focusing on the norms and 
values that inform recurrent patterns of behaviour, we can identify what it is that may 
differentiate say a corporate organisation in the US from one in Japan, or even what may 
distinguish one region from another. If it makes sense to think of ‘East Asia’ as 
something more than simply a fairly arbitrarily demarcated geographical entity, but rather 
as a part of the world that shares some distinctive commonalties, it is because particular 
institutions either resemble each other or perform similar functions. 
 
Finally, before looking at institutional theory in any detail, it is important to distinguish 
between institutions and organisations. Oran Young (1994: 26) suggests that institutions 
can be thought of as a ‘set of rules or conventions that define a social practice, assign 
roles. . . and guide interactions’, but that organisations, by contrast, are ‘material entities 
possessing budgets, personnel, offices, equipment, and legal personality’. This is clearly a 
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useful way of differentiating between the sorts of formally constituted organisations 
considered in this book like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the 
Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum. Of course, in general discussion 
such organisations are invariably also described as ‘institutions’. The important point to 
emphasise here, however,  is that, on the one hand, such organisations will themselves 
reflect a particular institutional setting that will define their capacities as a collective 
actors (Scott 1995: 55),  on the other, they may be directly involved in the attempted 
institutionalisation of particular political and economic practices. While we might want to 
reserve the term ‘organisation’ to describe formally constituted and recognised entities, 
they are involved in precisely the same sorts of processes of institutionalisation as are 
more loosely defined institutions. Indeed, as the IMF’s prominent role suggests, various 
organisations have played a key role in attempting to either consolidate existing, or 
establish new, patterns of behaviour. The remainder of this section considers some of the 
major contributions to institutional theory. It is necessarily a highly selective and 
impressionistic review; it is intended to highlight some of the key insights that have 
emerged from institutional theory’s various sub-divisions. 
 
Institutions in economics  
 
In both the disciplines of economics and political science, the standing of institutional 
theory has waxed and waned. In economics, institutional theory was pioneered by the 
likes of Thorstein Veblen and John Commons, and despite some important differences 
between them,3 the early institutionalists were united by a holistic and non-formalist 
approach that attempted to describe the complexity and multidimensionality of 
historically specific human activity.  Much of the ‘new’ institutionalism in economics, by 
contrast, is centered on the highly abstract assumptions of methodological individualism 
and consequently develops a very different conception of the dynamics of social activity. 
In this later form of institutionalism, the theoretical influence of which can be clearly 
seen in the policy directives of institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, the 
aggregated actions of individuals making rational choices that reflect their own interests 
are expected to lead – when permitted – to economically optimal outcomes. Although it 
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is also possible to distinguish a number of sub-divisions in the new economic 
institutionalism,4 the point to stress is that from the perspective of the new institutional 
economics it is considered possible to utilize economic theory, especially the neoclassical 
variety, to assess and improve the ‘efficiency’ of institutions. 
 
Oliver Williamson has been major contributor to a theory of institutions derived from 
such premises. For Williamson (1985: 17), the key concept with which to understand the 
general development of capitalism is the idea of ‘transaction costs’. Transaction cost 
economics is ‘mainly concerned with the governance of contractual relations’ 
(Williamson 1993: 112). Williamson and his followers are primarily concerned with how 
economic activity is organized and coordinated, the sorts of institutions that are necessary 
for its continuation, and with identifying the costs that are associated with such activities. 
In a world in which people are assumed to be rational, utility maximizing and 
individualistic, organizational development will not only be driven by such essentially 
atomistic forces, but the possible course of development will be fundamentally 
constrained by the model’s inherent logic and the necessity of reducing costs. 
 
A couple of points are worth making about this influential perspective. First, the 
conception of rationality it assumes, even in its more restricted and ‘bounded’ form, 
displays an almost teleological view of economic and organizational development. 
Moreover, it is reflective of a widely held perspective which shows little appreciation of 
the possibility that rationality itself may be a socially constructed phenomenon that takes 
different forms in different circumstances (Taylor 1982). Yet even if we accept that some 
forms of organization are clearly more ‘efficient’ than others when judged from the 
limited calculus of economic rationality, this does not necessarily mean that there is only 
one way of solving a particular collective action problem. Indeed, when placed in an East 
Asian context, one of the most interesting questions that emerges from a transaction cost 
perspective revolves around the possibility that some institutional configurations may be 
socially embedded in such a way as to reduce transaction costs by replacing the 
potentially expensive, legalistic enforcement of contracts with a form of ‘trust’ 
(Fukuyama 1995). Even if the importance of trust-based economic relationships is 
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difficult to demonstrate and needs to be treated with some caution, the idea that 
institutionalized relationships may reflect broader social forces or a range of social 
values, not simply individualistic, market-centered ones is important; as is the idea that 
such relationships might persist through time whether ‘efficient’ or not.  
 
The idea that institutional structures endure and display a degree of ‘path-dependency’ 
has been most fully developed by Douglas North. For North (1990: 384), institutions 
consist of ‘informal constraints and formal rules and of their enforcement characteristics. 
Together they provide the rules of the game of human interaction’. While this 
formulation is in keeping with a number of the other perspectives considered above, what 
really sets North’s work apart is his stress on the importance of history: institutions are 
shaped by past actions and effectively delimit and constrain possible actions in the 
present. The most celebrated example of this form of path dependency is the QWERTY 
keyboard configuration which, while clearly a less than optimal historical legacy has 
proved resistant to change (Arthur 1989). While North’s work is an important 
contribution to our understanding of the constraining role of existent institutions and a 
powerful reminder that the present is ultimately shaped by the past, like Williamson, 
North’s (1996: 5 [1990]) work is underpinned by the ‘choice theoretic approach of 
neoclassical economic theory’. In other words, despite the sort of sophisticated historical  
analysis that North develops, ultimately it is the ‘development of efficient economic 
organization’ that drives economic development and human history (North and Thomas 
1999:1[1973]). Like their assumptions about rationality, North’s and Williamson’s views 
of efficiency reflect the narrow preoccupations of the their discipline, which need to be 
complemented with insights from other areas if institutional theory is to have greater 
theoretical application. 
 
Institutions in political science 
 
The status of institutional theory in political science highlights the importance of the 
levels of analysis question.5 Institutions operate at various levels and this is reflected in 
the different centres of analytical attention that have emerged in political science. March 
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and Olsen played an important role in highlighting the importance of, and renewing 
interest in, institutions, especially at the ‘domestic’ level. They argued that national 
polities needed to be unbundled so that their institutional components – the bureaucracy, 
the legislature and the like – could be identified, their inter-relationships explored,  and 
their importance as distinct political actors potentially enjoying a degree of autonomy 
highlighted. For March and Olsen (1984: 739) the internal processes of political 
institutions had the capacity to ‘affect the flow of history’, determining wider social 
accommodations. One of their key insights revolved around the degree of autonomy 
necessary for political institutions to work effectively: 
 
Every democratic system faces a difficult problem of  balancing the undoubted advantages, 
even necessity, of institutional autonomy with the risks that such autonomy will make 
popular control difficult or impossible. Ultimately, the system works only because of 
institutionalised limits and mutual trust (March and Olsen 1989: 166). 
 
This is clearly an important issue when thinking about the possible reconfiguration of 
institutions in East Asia. If critics of ‘crony capitalism’ are correct, then there may be 
much to be said for establishing a greater distance between politicians and bureaucrats. 
And yet it is also important to recognise that in the view of many observers, much of East 
Asia’s erstwhile economic success could be attributed to functionally superior patterns of 
institutional organisation or governance. What Peter Evans (1995: 12) described as 
‘embedded autonomy’ referred to the way in which the bureaucracies in East Asian 
developmental states were ‘embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state 
to society and provides institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and 
renegotiation of policies’. Rather than being seen as too close to business, a well-
connected bureaucracy provided the critical link through which governments might 
implement policy with the co-operation of  business. Whether this neo-Weberian 
perspective should be considered a concern of politics or sociology is not of major 
concern here. What is important is that this sort of analysis was part of a concerted effort 
to ‘bring the state back in’ to its ‘proper central place in explanations of social change 
and politics’ (Skocpol 1985: 28).  
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Welcome as this recognition of the state’s importance may have been, much of the 
ensuing analysis occurred at a high level of abstraction and generalisation in which the 
state became the ‘master’ institution. While ‘the state’ clearly was and is a useful 
analytical construct, it became apparent that  analyses that broadly distinguished between 
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states neglected much of the specific institutional complexity that 
actually determined state effectiveness (Doner 1992).  Other observers argued that not   
only was much of the state’s internal institutional architecture a highly specific legacy of 
contingent historical circumstances (Cerny 1990), but that this was itself a fundamental 
determinant of state capacity (Mann 1993). Yet perhaps the greatest challenge for state 
theorists and public policy practitioners alike has been the increasing international 
integration and institutionalisation of activities that formerly occurred predominantly 
within national borders.  
 
Robert Keohane has been closely associated with the development of ‘neoliberal 
institutionalism’. Although Keohane and his followers accept much of conventional 
‘realist’ view of international relations – states pursue power and this is a function of 
their material capacities –  they depart from orthodox realism in their belief that states’ 
also have a capacity for mutually beneficial co-operation. International institutions – 
which may be either intergovernmental organisations, international regimes, or 
conventions – play a crucial role in socialising states into co-operative behaviour 
(Keohane 1989). In this view, the impact of a fundamentally anarchical inter-state system 
can, at the very least, be militated through the construction of various international 
institutions designed to address issues of common concern or resolve collective action 
problems.6 In many ways Keohane’s view of co-operation is reminiscent of the economic 
institutionalists and borrows freely from their methodologies: states are essentially 
rational and co-operate to reduce transaction costs (Keohane 1984). Consequently, his 
earlier work is susceptible to precisely the same sorts of critiques. Nevertheless, Keohane 
has played a crucial role in highlighting the increasingly interconnected and 
interdependent nature of the international system (Keohane and Nye 1977).  It is simply 
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no longer possible to understand ‘domestic’ institutional change without placing it in a 
larger international context. 
 
Recently, Keohane has given more attention to the source and content of the ideas that 
institutions embody and/or attempt to promulgate (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). This is 
crucial for, as the Asian crisis and its aftermath reminds us, the United States has 
demonstrated a desire to try and impose particular institutional and ideational frameworks 
on the region. Indeed, it is worth re-emphasising that the ending of the Cold War 
provided a massive and unexpected shock to the international system that has 
fundamentally overturned much of the conventional wisdom about the possibly declining 
position of the United States and its relationship to East Asia. Not only is the United 
States often seen as the unchallenged leader of a unipolar system (Matsanundo 1997), but 
it has shown a willingness to try and utilise its less strategically constrained position to 
create an international regime that furthers its own interests (Beeson 1999b). If such an 
agenda is to succeed, however, it will ultimately need to have an impact at the micro, as 
well as the macro level. In this regard, sociological theories of institutionalisation have 
much to teach us. 
 
Institutions in sociology 
 
One of the most important contributions of the sociological approach generally has been 
to ‘ground’ institutions and give them an important and distinctive degree of historical 
specificity. In an influential and much-cited article Mark Gronovetter develops a 
powerful rebuttal of the highly abstract picture of atomistic actors driven by a universal 
rationality that characterises much economic, and by imitation, political analysis, of 
individual and institutional behaviour. Gronovetter stresses that economic activity occurs 
in a complex network of contingent social relationships that inevitably shape behaviour. 
Consequently, ‘what looks to the analyst like nonrational behaviour may be quite sensible 
when situational constraints, especially those of embeddedness, are fully appreciated’ 
(Gronovetter 1985: 506). Put differently, the range of influences that press upon 
individual actors in a specific historical and geographical setting, be they social, 
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economic or political, makes the expectation that they will be driven by, and respond 
identically to, the same sorts of universal imperatives highly problematic. 
 
One of the key determinants of behaviour, and one of the things that the sociological 
variant of institutional theory highlights, is that individuals are deeply immersed in 
routines that impart a taken-for-granted quality to everyday life, which in turn lends a 
self-sustaining quality to institutions. Individuals do not choose freely amongst various 
institutions or norms,  in the manner implied by much rational choice theory, but largely 
reproduce existent patterns of behaviour. Crucially, as DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 11) 
argue, ‘Institutions do not just constrain options: they establish the very criteria by which 
people discover their preferences. In other words, some of the most important sunk costs 
are cognitive’. This is not to suggest that the reproduction of everyday life is an apolitical 
or uncontested process that is to be understood simply as a function of freely undertaken 
cognitive processes. On the contrary, Bourdieu (1991) has demonstrated just how 
politicised the production and institutionalisation of ‘common sense’ understandings of 
‘reality’ can be. Rather, the point to stress here is that the sort of ‘isomorphism’ or 
structural convergence that is implicit in much of the economic and political analysis 
considered above, and which is being actively championed by organisations like the IMF, 
may require coercive pressure if it is to have any chance of  overcoming the  institutional 
inertia and social embeddedness that distinguishes one social system from another. 
 
Other sociologists, particularly those interested in comparative economic systems, have 
demonstrated just how different, and thus how potentially resistant to change, East Asian 
social structures in particular are. There a number of highly distinctive  business systems 
in East Asia which display major differences in organisational logic and associated 
patterns of social behaviour  to those of the market-centred, Anglo-American style model 
advocated by the IMF. In Japan, Korea and throughout the Chinese diaspora, very 
different patterns of economic co-ordination have emerged under the general rubric of 
capitalism (Whitley 1990). The significance of these different economic co-ordination 
mechanisms is that private businesses behaviour is institutionalised in ways  that 
differentially shape organisational behaviour and structure. Whether or not these are 
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considered to be ‘successful’ or ‘appropriate’ in the wake of the crisis is not the issue 
here. The point to recognise is that: 
 
The business organisations found in each of these economies are not corruptions of 
technically ideal organisational forms, but represent qualitatively distinct 
conceptualisations of what constitutes appropriate economic activity…To be “technically 
efficient”, firms must consider and comply with the institutional setting in which they are 
embedded (Orrù et al 1991: 363 [emphasis added]).   
 
Because ‘rational’ behavior is so contingent, and because institutions have the effect of 
embedding particular practices, existent business structures have potentially important 
implications, even in an era characterized by processes of globalization. As Richard 
Whitley (1998: 447) points out, because different economic systems are so deeply 
embedded, even a global competitive system would inevitably reflect ‘the national, 
regional and international institutional arrangements in which it emerged and be 
structured by the conflicts and competition between existing economic systems and their 
leading actors for control over its defining norms and characteristics’. What is true of  
predominantly economic systems may equally apply to other institutions as diverse as  
social security  or labor relations systems. 
 
Even though institutions evolve within, and may be redefined by, political and economic 
contestation, they constrain and delimit the realm of the possible. In short, history 
matters. To see why history is so crucial, we need to look at historical institutionalism. 
 
Historical institutionalism 
 
Although Douglas North takes history seriously, his analysis of economic development is 
ultimately framed by the underlying assumptions of neo-classical economics. Historical 
institutionalists, by contrast, reject the all-encompassing logic of rational choice theory 
and stress the way in which  institutions can actually determine the nature of choice itself. 
For historical institutionalists, institutions not only shape actor strategies (as in rational 
choice theory), but their goals and interests as well (Finnemore 1996) – an insight that 
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reinforces the importance of cognitive dimension stressed in sociological institutionalism. 
Institutions have the potential to play a crucial role in delimiting both what is technically 
feasible and what is considered to be possible or appropriate: 
 
…by mediating their relations of co-operation and conflict, institutions structure political 
situations and leave their imprint on political outcomes…Reconfiguring institutions can 
save actors the trouble of fighting the same battle over and over again  (Thelen and 
Steinmo 1992: 9).  
 
This perceptive passage highlights an issue that is central to the concerns of this book: 
because a particular institutional matrix shapes and delimits possible social activities, the 
construction or reconfiguration of institutions is necessarily a deeply political process. In 
order to change established patterns of behaviour, it is necessary to change the 
institutions that are both an expression of, and  major influences on, social practices. 
Once reconfigured, the new institutional formation has the potential to ‘lock in’ specific 
patterns of behaviour – something which helps to explain the preoccupation with 
institutional reform on the part of external agencies like the IMF. One of the most striking 
qualities of established institutions is their capacity to perpetuate particular patterns of 
behaviour, or give continuing primacy to specific ideas, even after they may have become 
redundant or lost support (Garret and Lange 1996;  Goldstein and Keohane 1993). The 
capacity to influence the reconfiguration of institutions, particularly by defining the 
normative values they embody is, therefore, a potentially crucial expression and 
consolidation of political power.  
 
One of the key insights a more historically informed brand of institutionalism has 
provided is a more detailed picture of the dialectical nature of institutional transformation 
and ‘the relationship between political actors as objects and agents of history’  (Thelen 
and Steinmo 1992: 10). Peter Hall’s (1986)  seminal study of economic policy-making in 
Britain and France highlighted the specific ‘institutional logic’ that informed policy 
making in each country, which was itself the product of  political struggles that had 
become institutionalised as specific social accommodations. The ‘routines and 
 14
rationalities’ that emerged within each country were an expression of and consolidated 
the very different approaches to economic management that developed as a consequence 
of their distinctive historical experiences. The key point that this sort of analysis 
highlights is that even the most apparently universal and abstract phenomenon like 
markets are embedded in social frameworks and institutions that are shaped by 
historically specific patterns of political contestation (Polanyi 1957). Although capitalism 
may currently be a universal and ubiquitous mode of economic organisation, it is realised 
in different ways that reflect the existing ‘logic’ of specific institutional formations. 
Different historical circumstances  impart a degree of path dependency to individual 
countries because ‘the institutional structure induces particular kinds of corporate and 
government behaviour by constraining and laying out a logic to the market and policy-
making process that is particular to that political-economy’ (Zysman 1994: 271). 
 
The key point that historical institutionalism illuminates, which is especially important in 
the context of possible East Asian transformation, is that the past matters and exerts an 
influence on the present, and that the future is not predetermined, but will be at least 
partly shaped by contingent factors. It is worth re-emphasising this point and the others 
that emerge from this overview of institutional theory: in short, historical circumstances 
impart a degree of path dependency to institutional development. Whether this is 
manifest at the micro level of everyday interaction and the cognitive maps with which 
individuals negotiate social reality, or at the level of national or even international 
politics, past accretions of power and interest crystallise in specific ways that shape and 
delimit possible future outcomes. The task, then, is to identify which institutions are 
especially significant in shaping development, under what circumstances change is likely 
to occur, and how new ideas or patterns of behaviour may be adopted. The second section 
looks more closely at the sorts of contingent factors that may be influential, paying 
particular attention to the role of ideas – for if there is one thing that all varieties of 
institutional theory agree upon, it is that institutions play a crucial role as transmitters of 
ideational values.  
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Institutional Change in East Asia 
 
The various schools of institutional theory suggest that institutions have key properties 
that make them significant determinants of social behaviour and economic outcomes 
across nations. Indeed, it is possible to argue that it is differences in the operation, density 
and logic of institutions within regions that makes regional differentiation analytically 
meaningful in the first place (Grieco 1997; Beeson and Jayasuriya 1998). In this section I 
shall initially  identify some of the more significant  sorts of institutions which are 
particularly important in shaping national and regional modes of governance. Following 
this, I shall consider the role played by ideas in attempting to encourage institutional 
reform in East Asia.  
 
Social systems of production 
 
There are a vast number of social phenomena that might be considered as institutions, 
some of which are plainly more important determinants of significant social outcomes 
than others. In a series of important articles J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer 
have developed the concept of ‘social systems of production’, which identifies a number 
of institutions which  they suggest play a key role in determining social outcomes. The 
idea of a social system of production stands as a shorthand  for the complex of  
institutional and  organisational structures which, when combined with social values, 
distinguish one political space from another.  Hollingsworth and Boyer (1998: 2) suggest 
that individual systems will be characterised  by the way the following institutions are 
integrated into social configurations: 
 
…the industrial relations system; the system of training of workers and managers; the 
internal structure of corporate firms; the structured relationships among firms in the same 
industry on the one hand, and on the other firms’ relationships with their suppliers and 
customers; the financial markets of a society; the conceptions of fairness and justice held 
by capital and labour; the structure of the state and its policies; and a society’s idiosyncratic 
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customs and traditions as well as norms, moral principles, rules, laws and recipes for 
action. 
 
It should stressed that even though institutions may be nominally alike across countries 
and regions, the precise role they play and their mode of integration in specific contexts 
will be dependent on their relationship with other institutions. A key variable here will be 
the sort of ‘co-ordinating mechanism’ that predominates within a given social context. 
Different societies may not necessarily be governed primarily by hierarchically ordered, 
market-dominated systems, as they are in the Anglo-American countries, but may be 
embedded in a range of horizontally organised, relationship-based networks. Indeed, 
Boyer and Hollingsworth (1998: 447) make the important point that much of the 
developmental success enjoyed by the more ‘interventionist’ states of East Asia and 
Western Europe flowed from their ability to develop institutional arrangements that 
contained, rather than enhanced market forces. East Asian social systems of production, 
therefore, while superficially similar to those of other countries, actually gave expression 
to differing operational logics, designed to realise particular, historically determined 
political and social goals. This is not to suggest that East Asian political–economies were 
without problems before the crisis or necessarily worked for the collective good. Rather, 
it is to suggest that specific historical accommodations and contingent material 
circumstances produce highly distinctive systems that reflect  particular constellations of 
power and interest,  which then become an institutionalised part of social reality.  
 
Whether such arrangements remain sources of regional, national or corporate advantage 
is a moot point that needs to be tested in specific circumstances. The important point in 
the context of this discussion is that East Asia’s distinctive institutional configurations 
clearly were considered  to be the key to the region’s development and former 
competitiveness (World Bank 1993: 6; 1997: 4). As a consequence, the specific 
institutional arrangements that underpinned the region’s distinctive social systems of 
production became a deeply embedded and generally legitimate part of the social fabric 
of individual nations. Indeed, it is worth emphasising that only major crises can establish 
the preconditions for the sort of fundamental structural transformation that is being 
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encouraged  in East Asia  (Gourevitch 1986). Significantly, the immediate source of 
pressure for change has been a transformation in the way region’s formerly admired 
institutions are now perceived. Whether this shift in perceptions is measured by the 
judgements of ‘the markets’ and the rapid exit of mobile capital from the region, or by 
the abrupt change in sentiment on the part of agencies like the IMF in particular, a critical 
change in the region’s position  has been ideational. If we want to understand both why 
the region is being encouraged to reform itself, and what the likelihood of alternative 
policy initiatives being accepted is, therefore, we need to look more closely at the role of 
ideas, their possible role as a catalyst for institutional reform, and the sorts of political 
and economic interests that are supporting or resisting their implementation. 
 
Ideas and institutional reform 
 
Although an interest in the role of ideas is still a relatively novel and contentious element 
of comparative political-economy (Blyth 1997), a focus on the ideational dimension of 
East Asia’s possible institutional evolution is justified for a number of reasons. First, and 
most obviously, one of the most striking consequences of the crisis has been a change in 
the way the region is perceived. As I suggested earlier, what were formerly taken to be 
sources of strength and competitive advantage are now often seen as structural 
weaknesses that must be reformed. The potential importance of changing sentiment 
toward the region was most dramatically illustrated in the crisis itself, where an abrupt 
transformation in perceptions led to massive and  rapid capital flight (Winters 2000; 
Beeson 1998). Nothing material had changed, but a paradigmatic shift in the conventional 
wisdom about the region’s relative strengths and weaknesses created a self-fulfilling 
momentum. 
 
The key question now that the region is seen by some to be in need of  reform, is whether 
an alternative, market-centred economic policy paradigm of the sort being advocated by 
organisations like the IMF will be adopted. At a time of crisis, when confidence in 
existent  modes of governance may be undermined, or when external actors and internal 
forces sympathetic to a new order may seek to exploit the opportunity to promote reform, 
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then the possibility of reconfiguring the existent institutional order is clearly increased.7 
Another reason for emphasising the ideational dimension of any possible reform process 
or institutional change, therefore, is because of the crucial role institutions play as sources 
and reflections of norms and values. Tangible institutional reform will necessitate a 
change in the institutional logic or embedded rationality that is reflected in, and shaped 
by, social practice. The point to emphasise here is that ideas are not simply disembodied 
entities with no direct connection to material or social ‘reality’. On the contrary, as 
Alexander Wendt (1999: 135) has persuasively argued, ‘power and interest have the 
effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up’. Put differently, ideas give 
direction, intentionality and purpose to power. 
 
Yet even if it is accepted that ideas are important determinants of the content and 
direction of policy in particular and social activity more generally, how are we to 
understand their relationship to institutions? Here we need to return to the levels of 
analysis question. One of the most important developments associated with processes of 
globalisation has been the emergence of a number supra-national institutions and 
organisations, which have effectively locked national governments into ‘an array of 
global, regional, and multilateral systems of government’ (Held et al 1999:55). Rosenau 
(1995) refers to this complex transnational interaction of institutional, ideational, and 
behavioural factors as ‘governance without government’. Although it is a moot point how 
extensive this mode of governance was prior to the crisis in East Asia, where national 
sovereignty was generally jealously guarded, it is important to try and identify how such 
forces are affecting ‘domestic’ institutions in the region. In particular, we need to 
consider the role played by specific organisations which play a role at this transnational 
level, especially where they are self-consciously championing – or resisting – particular 
ideas or reform agendas.8 One of the most pregnant characteristics of the emergent and  
increasingly globalised post-war order is that it appears to have socialised states into 
certain forms of behaviour which have become an institutionalised part of inter-state 
relations, effectively consolidating a particular international order (Ikenberry 1998; 
Ruggie 1992). The key question is how far East Asian states have adopted such practices, 
particularly at the level of domestic social practice. 
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At the national level it is important to establish whether such agendas are either being 
implemented, resisted, or mediated by intervening institutions in such a way so as to give 
them  a distinctive and contingent form. A number of considerations seem pertinent in 
this regard. On the one hand particular ideas, especially where they are purported to 
provide solutions to specific problems, may be expected to be attractive to ruling elites 
casting around for new policies (Campbell 1998; Woods 1995). On the other, we must 
expect that the existing institutional matrix will – following the logic of path-dependency 
- continue to exert a major influence. As Hall (1999: 159) points out, ‘the existing 
institutional structure of the political economy will affect the kinds of adjustments most 
likely to be made to it or to policy’. The more conventional staples of political analysis 
are still important here: who wins, who loses, and what capacity do they have to promote 
or retard institutional reform? In this context, it is important to recognise that throughout 
East Asia there are already significant numbers of technocrats and business elites that are 
broadly sympathetic to neoliberal reform.9  The crucial question is whether such forces 
are capable of effectively challenging the existing institutional order through a 
fundamental ideational shift.  
 
This serves to remind us that many of the institutions in which we are interested here are 
not only crucial carriers of norms and values, but they affect the populations of East Asia 
at the sub-state level. Although the transnational consolidation of  specific behavioural 
norms is a crucially important part of the overarching international system in which East 
Asian states are embedded and an increasing constraint on governmental actions 
(Kratochwil 1989), it is at the sub-state level that some of the most important influences 
of ideational change may be felt. Institutions at this sub-state or domestic level are crucial 
components of the ‘social construction of reality’, effectively ‘channelling’ behaviour in 
specific directions (Berger and Luckman 1966). It is worth re-emphasising that ‘the 
remarkable feature of institutional structures is that people continue to acknowledge and 
co-operate in many of them even when it is by no means obviously to their advantage to 
do so’ (Searle 1995: 92). It is not necessary to decide whether institutions like 
interventionist states, non-independent legal systems, or even ‘Asian values’ are 
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appropriate, efficient, or the result of ‘ideological’ manipulation, to recognise that they 
will affect the chances of reform. The challenge is to identify and weigh the various 
sources of continuity and change that operate at various levels across the region. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This brief and selective review of institutional theory has attempted to identify the most 
important contributions from the various disciplines that have employed this approach, 
and suggest how such an approach can be utilised to understand the forces that may be 
promoting or resisting change in East Asia. By way of a conclusion, I shall recapitulate 
the key points that have emerged from this discussion and link them to issues of  
institutional development in the region. 
 
At the heart of the reform agenda being pressed upon the region is a desire to promote 
greater transparency in the way economic and political institutions operate, and to 
encourage a greater separation between business and government by making market 
mechanisms a more central determinant of economic outcomes. Superficially, this may 
seem like a fairly anodyne and technical argument about the efficient design of 
institutions in pursuit of reduced transaction costs. And yet, as we have seen, institutional 
reform will inevitably involve reconfiguring existent patterns of power and interest that 
currently benefit from them. 
 
One of the most important insights to emerge from the institutionalist approach generally 
is that historically entrenched patterns of behaviours and social relations powerfully 
constrain and shape possible future outcomes. Even if – and this is clearly a big ‘if’ – 
there is a widely held view amongst influential policymakers and vested interests at the 
national and international levels that institutional reform is desirable, path dependency 
will inevitably give a particular cast to subsequent developments. The key question in this 
regard is whether existent institutionalised relationships and patterns of behaviour are so 
entrenched as to make significant reform difficult. Even if it could be demonstrated that 
the sort of neoliberal reforms adopted by a number of Anglo-American economies and 
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promoted by agencies like the IMF were in some way functionally superior – and this 
remains a highly contentious debate – would this prove enough to overcome existing 
institutional inertia and encourage thoroughgoing reform? 
 
While ideas about the content and direction of reform are clearly important, their 
adoption depends largely on the circumstances in which they are championed. If existing 
institutions are perceived to be dysfunctional, especially in the wake of a crisis, then the 
prospects for some new paradigm being adopted are plainly enhanced. However, 
ideational processes are characterised by contestation and reflect the interests and power 
of their adherents as much as they do any inherent rationality. In this context, we need to 
remember that, especially within East Asia, alternative, indigenous ideational 
perspectives have emerged, which may serve an important legitimation function, and  
which consequently make any seamless transition to, or adoption of,  new ways of 
organising social, political or economic activity inherently problematic. 
 
This is not to suggest that change is impossible given sufficiently compelling incentives 
and an attractive, alternative policy paradigm. It is simply to emphasise that the reality of 
institutional development in East Asia – or anywhere else, for that matter – is likely to be 
complex, contested and contingent. The great advantage of the institutionalist approach is 
that it allows us to identify the forces encouraging and resisting change, while 
simultaneously providing some way of making sense of the complex reality that emerges 
as a consequence. The multidimensional and multi-level conceptualisation that 
institutional theory affords provides a way of building up a picture of the distinctive 
patterns of behaviour that distinguish development within East Asia. Even in an era 
characterised by processes of globalisation, institutional theory can help us explain the 
different way such process are mediated and manifest in particular locations.  
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Endnotes 
 
1 For an analysis of the crisis, see Beeson and Robison (2000). For a critique of the IMF’s 
handling of the crisis, see Sachs (1998). 
2 The discussion in this section draws heavily on and develops ideas first outlined in 
Beeson (1999a). 
3 For a discussion of the differences between Commons and Veblen and their relationship 
to the ‘new’ institutionalism in economics, see Groewegen et al (1995). 
4 See Leys (1996) for a more detailed consideration of these differences. 
5 See Buzan (1995) for a detailed consideration of this issue. 
6 This view is consistent with Hedley Bull’s (1977:56) influential international relations 
perspective, which argued that the maintenance of an international society that permitted 
cooperation was dependent upon the institutionalization of specific rules and behaviors.  
7 The dramatic rise of monetarism in the UK during the 1980s, for example,  was clearly 
partly a result of the apparent exhaustion of British Keynesianism on the one hand, and 
the proselytizing efforts of champions of market-oriented reform on the other. See 
Cockett (1994). 
8 ‘Neo-Gramscian’ scholars have drawn attention to the crucial role played by various 
international organizations and institutions in consolidating the ideational influence of 
neoliberal policies and seemingly constraining the sorts of policies that are deemed 
feasible. See Gill (1997). 
9 Not only is it important to acknowledge that there are supporters of neoliberal ideas in 
East Asia, but where alternatives have been discredited or simply do not exist, this may 
make the consolidation of a new ideational order more feasible. Chang (1998: 1559) 
argues that Korea’s ‘relatively weak intellectual tradition’ made it especially receptive to 
neoliberal ideas. 
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